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Existence of a dictatorial subgroup in social
choice with independent subgroup utility scales,
an alternative proof
Anna B. Khmelnitskaya
Abstract Social welfare orderings for different scales of individual utility measure-
ment in distinct population subgroups are studied. In Khmelnitskaya and Weymark
(2000), employing the continuous version of Arrow’s impossibility theorem, it was
shown that for combinations of independent subgroups scales every corresponding
social welfare ordering depends on the utilities of only one of the subgroups and is
determined in accordance with the scale type proper to this dictatorial subgroup. In
this article we introduce an alternative completely self-contained proof based on the
study of the structure of level surfaces of a social welfare function which provides a
real-valued representation of the social welfare ordering.
1 Introduction
In Arrow’s famous impossibility theorem [1], individual preferences are ordinally
measurable and interpersonally noncomparable. Building on the seminal work of
Sen [14], there is now an extensive literature that investigates the implications for
social decision-making of alternative assumptions concerning the measurability and
interpersonal comparability of individual preferences. See, for example, Roberts
[12], [13], d’Aspremont [3], Yanovskaya [16], [17], Tsui and Weymark [15], Bossert
and Weymark [2]. These studies adapt mainly the welfarist approach to social choice
and assume that only individual utilities matter for ranking a feasible set of social al-
ternatives. In this case a social choice rule can be equivalently described in terms of
a social welfare ordering – a social ordering of the admissible profiles of individual
utilities (admissibility is understood as the satisfaction of several a priori appealing
conditions), or in terms of a social welfare function — a function that represents a
social welfare ordering and measures social welfare. Various assumptions concern-
Anna B. Khmelnitskaya
SPb Institute for Economics and Mathematics Russian Academy of Sciences, 1 Tchaikovsky St.,
191187, St.Petersburg, Russia, e-mail: a.khmelnitskaya@math.utwente.nl
1
2 Anna Khmelnitskaya
ing the measurability and interpersonal comparability of utility can be formalized
by partitioning the set of feasible individual profiles and requiring the social welfare
ordering to be constant over a cell of the partition. These studies show that under
different measurability-comparability assumptions over individual utilities, i.e., in
case when more democracy is adapted by the society, classes of nondictatorial so-
cial choice rules exist that satisfy all of Arrow’s axioms (restated in terms of utility
functions). In the aforecited publications the measurement scales of individual util-
ities are assumed to be of the same type across the entire society. An extension of
this direction is a study of Arrovian social choice problems when individual utilities
in disjoint subgroups of individuals are measured by different scale types, in other
words, when separate subgroups of individuals admit different types of information.
This situation is common in real decision making. A typical example is the parti-
tioning of a human society into families which in turn consist of individuals. If an
outsider is making the comparisons based on reports from individuals, it is reason-
able to suppose that the kind of information available within and between families
will be different in general. Indeed, the kinds of utility comparisons that can be
made within a family cannot be made between people who do not know each other.
A number of publications of the author (Khmelnitskaya [7], [9], Khmelnitskaya and
Weymark [10]) is devoted to study of Arrovian social choice problems with differ-
ent scales of individual utility measurement in disjoint subgroups of individuals. In
particular, in Khmelnitskaya and Weymark [10] it is shown that for ordinally or car-
dinally measurable subgroup utility when levels (and in the case of cardinal utilities,
differences) of utility may or may not be interpersonally comparable while no util-
ity comparisons between subgroups are possible, every continuous social welfare
ordering that meets the weak Pareto principle depends on the utilities of only one of
the subgroups and is determined in accordance with the scale type admissible to this
dictatorial subgroup. Here we introduce another proof1 for this statement restated
in equivalent terms of a social welfare function. This proof is longer but completely
self-contained different to the proof in [10] which is based on the employment of
Bossert-Weymark [2] continuous analogue of both – Arrow’s [1] impossibility the-
orem and Sen’s [14] variant of Arrow’s theorem for cardinally measurable utilities.
Moreover, being based on the study of level surfaces of a social welfare function
this proof provides also extra deep insight into the structure of possible interrela-
tions between utilities of different individuals, while the proof in [10] allows only
to state existence of a dictatorial subgroup.
In Section 2, we introduce basic definitions and notation and provide a formal
statement of the problem. Section 3, provides the proof of the existence of a dicta-
torial subgroup for different combinations of mutually independent subgroup scales
restated in terms of a social welfare function.
1 This proof circulated before in Khmelnitskaya’s unpublished manuscript [8].
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2 The framework
Consider a society consisting of a finite set N = {1, . . . ,n} of n ≥ 2 individuals.
Let X be a finite set of at least three alternatives and let R denote the set of all
possible preference orderings over X . The members of R are assumed to be weak
orders, i.e., complete, reflexive and transitive binary relations. A social choice prob-
lem is a triple <X ,N,{Ri}i∈N >, where {Ri}i∈N is a profile of individual preferences
Ri ∈R, i ∈ N. To introduce measurability/comparability assumptions, we consider
individual preferences represented as individual utilities, which may be interpreted
as measurements of these preferences. So, let U be the set of all real-valued func-
tions defined on X ×N: for any u ∈U , let u(x, i) denote the ith individual utility at
the alternative x ∈ X . By a solution to a social choice problem we understand a so-
cial welfare functional, which is a mapping f : D →R where D ⊆U is the domain
of f . We assume f satisfies three welfarism axioms:
Unrestricted Domain. D =U , i.e., f is defined for all u ∈U .
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. For any u,u′ ∈D and A⊆X , if u(x, i) =
u′(x, i) for all x ∈ A and i ∈ N, then R : A = R′ : A where R = f (u) and R′ = f (u′).
(R : A denotes the restriction of R to A⊆ X .)
Pareto Indifference. For any pair x,y ∈ X and for all u ∈ D , if u(x, i) = u(y, i)
for all i ∈ N then xIy, where I denotes the indifference relation corresponding to
R= f (u).
According to the welfarism theorem (D’Aspremont and Gevers [4] and Hammond
[6]), these three axioms ensure that only individual utilities matter when ranking
social alternatives, so any vector u = (u1, . . . ,un) in the n-dimensional Euclidian
space IRn can be considered as a profile of individual utilities for the society N; here
ui is the utility of ith individual. From this perspective, a solution to a social choice
problem can be regarded as a social welfare ordering (SWO), which is a weak order
R∗ on IRn, the set of possible profiles of utility vectors. We assume that R∗ also
satisfies the Weak Pareto property.
Weak Pareto (WP). For all u,v ∈ IRn, if ui > vi for all i ∈ N, then uP∗v, where P∗
denotes the strict preference relation corresponding to R∗.
A function W : IRn→ IR1 represents the SWO R∗ if for all u,v ∈ IRn
uR∗v⇐⇒W (u)≥W (v).
The representation W is called a social welfare function (SWF). By WP, any SWF
W is strictly increasing, i.e., for all u,v ∈ IRn
u v=⇒W (u)>W (v).
We impose one more restriction on an SWO R∗ requiring R∗ to be continuous.
Continuity (C). For all u ∈ IRn, the sets {v ∈ IRn | vR∗u} and {v ∈ IRn | uR∗v} are
closed in IRn.
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Continuity guarantees the existence of a continuous SWF [5].
In the sequel by Dn, we denote the diagonal of IRn. Let for any real c ∈ IR1, cN
be a vector in IRn with all components equal to c and let g(c) = {u ∈ IRn|W (u) = c}
be a c-level surface of the SWF W ; obviously, for every u ∈ IRn, g(W (u)) is a level
surface of W containing u.
Remark 1 Because of continuity and strict monotonicity of all SWF, every level
surface of any SWF meets a diagonal Dn of IRn and moreover, this meet of set is a
singleton. Hence, a natural scale for the meanings of SWF arises: since every SWF
W is defined up to monotonic strictly increasing transforms, then without loss of
generality it may be assumed that for any u ∈ IRn, W (u) = c, with c defined by the
equality g(W (u))∩Dn = {cN}.
In the classic case of Arrow utilities were ordinally measurable and interperson-
ally non-comparable. More generally, within the SWO framework, the degree of
measurability and comparability of utility inside the society N can be specified by a
class of invariance transforms F , where each transform f ∈F is a list of functions
f = {fi}i∈N , fi : IR1→ IR1, with the property: for all u,v ∈ IRn
uR∗v⇐⇒ (fu)R∗(fv), (1)
where fu = {fiui}i∈N . In what follows we use the notation FN , when we need to
specify to which particular society N the transforms of a class F apply; when no
ambiguity appears, the index N will be omitted.
Under conditions imposed, the Arrovian social choice problem in the informa-
tional environment introduced by an invariance class F can be equivalently de-
scribed in terms of SWF W which
1) is a continuous real-valued function W : IRn→ IR1, such that for any c ∈ IR1,
W (cN) = c;
2) is nondecreasing2, i.e., for all u,v ∈ IRn,
u≥ v=⇒W (u)≥W (v);
3) is invariant under invariance transforms of class F , i.e., for any f ∈ F and
for all u,v ∈ IRn,
W (u)≥W (v) =⇒W (fu)≥W (fv). (2)
For an invariance class F to be a scale in the sense of the standard theory of
measurement it has to satisfy the stronger condition of being a group (see Phanzagl
[11]). Different scale types for individual utility measurement have been examined
in the literature (Roberts [13], d’Aspremont [3], Bossert and Weymark [2]). Next
we list the scales to be considered.
Ordinal Measurability (OM). f ∈F iff f is a list of independent strictly increas-
ing transforms fi, i ∈ N.
2 This holds because W is continuous and strictly increasing.
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Ordinal Measurability and Full Comparability (OFC). f ∈ F iff f is a list of
identical strictly increasing transforms, i.e., for any real t and all i∈N, fi(t) = f0(t)
where f0 is a strictly increasing function independent of i.
Cardinal Measurability (CM). f ∈F iff f is a list of independent strictly positive
affine transforms, i.e., for any real t and all i ∈ N, fi(t) = ai+bit for some real ai
and real bi > 0.
Cardinal Measurability and Unit Comparability (CUC). f ∈F iff f is a list of
strictly positive affine transforms with common unit, i.e., for any real t and all i∈N,
fi(t) = ai+b t for some real ai and b > 0 with b independent of i.
Cardinal Measurability and Full Comparability (CFC). f ∈ F iff f is a list of
identical strictly positive affine transforms, i.e., for any real t and all i ∈ N fi(t) =
a+b t for some real a and b > 0, both independent of i.
The main concern of this paper is the situation when the entire society N is par-
titioned into m disjoint subgroups of individuals, i.e., N = N1 ∪N2 ∪ ·· · ∪Nm with
Ni ∩N j = /0 for i 6= j. It is assumed that a SWF W defined on IRn for different
subgroups of variables indexed by Nk, k∈{1, . . . ,m}, may admit invariance trans-
forms of different invariance classesFNk , which amounts toW being invariant under
transforms of a class FN such that FN = {FNk}mk=1, i.e., for every f ∈ FN for all
k∈{1, . . . ,m}, fNk = {fi}i∈Nk ∈ FNk . In other words FN is the Cartesian product
of the subgroup classes of transforms FNk . Notice that the class FN meets the con-
dition (1). But, in general, even if all invariant classes FNk are scales, FN is not
necessarily a scale: the condition of being a group may no longer hold. For exam-
ple, a combination of CFC scales with a common zero is not a scale. In what follows
we concentrate on mutually independent subgroup scales. The subgroup scales FNk ,
k= 1, . . . ,m, are mutually independent, if for any distinct k1,k2 ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, for all
i ∈ Nk1 and j ∈ Nk2 , there exist fi ∈ FNk1 and f j ∈ FNk2 such that fi(t) = ai+bit
with bi > 0 and f j(t) = a j+b jt with b j > 0, where ai 6= a j and bi 6= b j. Note that
since OM and CM include the positive affine transforms, these classes are covered
by the above definition as well. Mutual Independence preserves the group property
and guarantees FN to be the direct product of groups FNk when each of the FNk is
a group, i.e., it guarantees FN to be a scale, if all FNk are scales. It should also be
stressed that Mutual Independence is a property of the set of subgroup classes of
transforms {FN1 , . . . ,FNm}, not of individual transforms within these classes.
Introduce now some extra notation. By nk we denote the cardinality of Nk. It
is obvious that mk=1 nk = n. Let for any u ∈ IRn and all k∈{1, . . . ,m}, uNk be a
subvector of u that belongs to IRnk and is composed of components ui, i ∈ Nk. IRNk
is a coordinate subspace of IRn induced by coordinates with indices from Nk, i.e.
IRNk = {v ∈ IRn | vi = 0, i /∈ Nk}.
For any u ∈ IRn and k∈{1, . . . ,m}, let
IRNk(u) = {u′ ∈ IRn | u′N\Nk = uN\Nk}
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be a hyperplane of dimension nk parallel to coordinate subspace IRNk and containing
u. Obviously, IRNk = IRNk(0) and IRNk(u) = u+ IRNk .
Denote by
DNk = {u ∈ IRNk | ui = u j, i, j ∈ Nk, & ui = 0, i /∈ Nk}
the diagonal of a coordinate subspace IRNk , and let LD be a subspace of IRn spanned
by the diagonals DNk , k∈{1, . . . ,m}. It is easy to see that every u ∈ LD, u= {ui}i∈N ,
has the form ui = vk(i), for some v = v(u) ∈ IRm and k(i) defined by the relation
i ∈ Nk(i), i.e., all variables in LD indexed by the same subgroup of indices have the
same value.




ui, i ∈ N\Nk,
c, i ∈ Nk.
It is easy to see that u‖cNk is an orthogonal projection of u on the hyperplane





c, i ∈ Nk,
0, i ∈ N\Nk.
We denote an orthogonal projection of the level surface g(c) to the hyperplane
IRNk(cN) by gNk(c). For any two points u,u
′ ∈ IRn, u 6= u′, let l(u,u′) and r[u,u′)
be respectively a straight line passing through both points, u and u′, and a ray start-
ing from u and passing through u′; moreover, by r(u,u′) = r[u,u′)\{u} we denote
an open ray without its origin.
As usual, IRn+ = {u ∈ IRn|ui ≥ 0, i ∈ N, & u 6= 0} is the nonnegative orthant
in IRn. For the mean value of a vector u ∈ IRn we use the standard notation u¯, i.e.
u¯= ( ni=1 ui)/n. Following [2], for any vector u ∈ IRn, the fan generated by u is
Y (u) = {u ∈ IRn|u= q1n+lu,q ∈ IR,l ∈ IR+}.
A subset Y of IRn is a fan, if it is a fan generated by some u ∈ IRn.
3 Existence of a dictatorial subgroup
Clearly, every continuous nondecreasing n-dimensional function that is determined
only by variables with indices from one of the subgroups and that is invariant un-
der invariance transforms proper to this subgroup of variables is a SWF. Below we
study the situations for which such a form of a SWF is the only possible one, or
equivalently, for which a dictatorial subgroup, i.e., a decisive coalition equal to one
of the subgroups of individuals, must exist. The social ordering is then determined
in accordance with the scale type of this dictatorial subgroup.
Existence of a dictatorial subgroup, an alternative proof 7
Theorem 1. Let N = N1 ∪N2 ∪ ·· · ∪Nm, Ni ∩N j = /0 for all i 6= j, and let a con-
tinuous nondecreasing function W : IRn→ IR1 with respect to variables indexed by
Nk be invariant under one of scales OM, OFM, CM, CUC, or CFC. Moreover, the
subgroup scales are assumed to be mutually independent. Then there exists a unique
integer k∈{1, . . . ,m}, such that for all u ∈ IRn, W has the form
W (u) =W (uNk),
i.e., W is determined only by variables indexed by Nk, and besides is fully charac-
terized by the scale type proper to this subset of variables.
Remark 2 Notice that any CFC transform at the same time is a transform of any
of the OM, OFM, CM and CUC invariant classes. Hence, it is possible to simplify
the statement of Theorem 1 by requiring only that the function W (u) with respect
to variables indexed by Nk, k∈{1, . . . ,m}, be invariant under mutually independent
CFC transforms.
Theorem 1 allows us to construct a SWF characterization for various combina-
tions of OM, OFM, CM, CUC and CFC independent subgroup utility scales on the
basis of well-known results for social choice problems with the same measurement
scales of individual utilities for the entire society.
In terms of level surfaces, the statement of Theorem 1 means that for any
function W (u), there exists a unique k∈ {1, . . . ,m} such that every level surface
g(c) is parallel to the coordinate subspace IRN\Nk . The latter is tantamount to
IRN\Nk(u) ⊂ g(W (u)), for all u ∈ IRn. It is not difficult to see that for the proof of
the last inclusion, it is sufficient to show that every meet of set g(W (u))∩ IRNk(u),
k∈{1, . . . ,m}, except one is a hyperplane of dimension nk. For different combina-
tions of mutually independent OM, CM and CUC scales, the result may be easily




(1−a)ai+at, a > 0, i ∈ N\Nk.
Indeed, for all combinations of OM, CM and CUC scales, for all k∈{1, . . . ,m},
every meet of set g(W (u))∩IRNk(u) together with any two points contains the whole
straight line passing through these points, and therefore has to be a hyperplane.
So, for this case the proof of Theorem 1 is rather simple. However, if we append
OFC and CFC scales, then the defined above transform f is inadmissible for all
combinations of scales, and not every meet of set g(W (u))∩ IRNk(u) is a hyperplane.
To prove Theorem 1, first, we show that every level surface g(c) contains its
own orthogonal projection gNk(c) on the hyperplane IR
Nk(cN), k∈{1, . . . ,m}, which
in turn coincides with the meet of set g(c)∩ IRNk(cN) (Lemma 1). Next, in terms
of these projections we derive a necessary and sufficient condition for a function
W (u) to be fully determined only by variables indexed by some fixed subgroup Nk
(Lemma 2). And finally, we prove that this condition holds under the hypothesis of
the theorem (Lemma 3 and Lemma 4).
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Lemma 1. Any level surface g(c) for all k∈{1, . . . ,m} contains its own orthogonal
projection on the hyperplane IRNk(cN), i.e.,
gNk(c)⊂ g(c), (3)
moreover, either dimgNk(c) = nk or dimgNk(c) = nk−1 and
gNk(c) = g(c)∩ IRNk(cN). (4)
Proof. Fix some k∈{1, . . . ,m}. To prove (3) it will suffice to show that for every
u ∈ g(c), u‖cN\Nk ∈ g(c). Let u ∈ g(c). If u ∈ IRNk(cN), then u‖cN\Nk = u and
obviously, u‖cN\Nk ∈ g(c). Assume u /∈ IRNk(cN). Due to Remark 1, cN ∈ g(c). Take
an admissible transform f = {fi}i∈N :
fi(t) =
{
t, i ∈ Nk,
(1−a)c+at, a > 0, i ∈ N\Nk.
By (2) for all a > 0,W (fu) =W (fcN). But for any a > 0, fcN = cN ∈ g(c). Hence,
for all a > 0, fu ∈ g(c), and moreover, since u /∈ IRNk(cN), fu corresponding to
different a are different. If a = 1, fu= u, whence r(u‖cN\Nk ,u)⊂ g(c). Therefore,
every neighborhood of u‖cN\Nk has a nonempty meet with g(c). Whence by conti-
nuity of W , u‖cN\Nk ∈ g(c). Since W (u) is defined for every u ∈ IRn, W (u‖cN\Nk) is
well defined. AssumeW (u‖cN\Nk) = a 6= c. Because of continuity ofW , there exists
a neighborhood S of u‖cN\Nk such that |W (u′)−a|< |c−a|/2, for all u′ ∈ S, where-
from |W (u′)−c|> |c−a|/2, for every u′ ∈ S. Hence, W (u′) 6= c, for all u′ ∈ S. The
obtained contradiction proves (3).
From the definition of orthogonal projection it follows directly that
gNk(c)⊂ IRNk(cN) (5)
and





Combining the last inequalities together with the equality dimg(c) = n− 1, we
obtain
nk−1≤ dimgNk(c)≤ nk.
From the definition of orthogonal projection it also follows that
g(c)∩ IRNk(cN)⊂ gNk(c).
From which together with (3) and (5), (4) follows immediately. uunionsq
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Remark 3 Lemma 1 remains true under a coarser partition of N into disjoint sub-
groups when a few subgroups Nk, k∈{1, . . . ,m}, may merge into one. It is worth
noting that this remark concerns all subsequent propositions as well.
Remark 4 Due to the admissibility of the transform {fi(t) = a+ t}i∈N for all real
a , the level surfaces g(c) relevant to different c can be obtained from each other by
parallel shifts along the diagonal Dn. (This property was mentioned earlier in [13]).
Wherefrom together with (4) it follows that for all real c and c′,
gNk(c
′) = gNk(c)+(c
′− c)N , (6)
i.e., all projections gNk(c) relevant to the same k and different c can be obtained from
each other by parallel shifts along Dn.
Remark 5 Observe that gNk(c) is a cone in IR
Nk(cN) with a top in cN . Indeed, if
u′ ∈ gNk(c) and u′ 6= cN , then there exists u ∈ g(c), u 6= cN , such that u′ = u‖cN\Nk .
Since cN ∈ g(c) and because of the admissibility of the transform {yi(t) = (1−
a)c+at}i∈N for all a > 0, r[cN ,u) ⊂ g(c). But the ray r[cN ,u′) is a projection of
the ray r[cN ,u) onto the hyperplane IRNk(cN). Thus, for every u′ ∈ gNk(c) such that
u′ 6= cN , r[cN ,u′) ⊂ gNk(c), which proves that gNk(c) is a cone. In particular, a cone
gNk(c) with dimgNk(c) = nk may coincide with IR
Nk(cN). If dimgNk(c) = nk−1, it
may be a hyperplane in IRNk(cN) passing through cN .
Denote by HNk(c) the cylinder gNk(c)+ IR
N\Nk .
Remark 6 As it was already noted in the proof of Lemma 1, for any real c and all
k∈{1, . . . ,m},
g(c)⊂ HNk(c). (7)
Lemma 2. A function W for any u ∈ IRn has the form
W (u) =W (uNk), for some k∈{1, . . . ,m},
i.e. depends only on the variables ui with indices i ∈ Nk, if and only if there exists
real c such that dimgNk(c) = nk−1.
Proof. I. Necessity. Clearly, for every real c
g(c)∩ IRNk(cN) = {u ∈ IRNk(cN) |W (u) = c}.
By hypothesis, for all u ∈ IRn and, in particular, for all u ∈ IRNk(cN), W (u) =
W (uNk). But for u∈ IRNk(cN), the variables uNk are intrinsic coordinates in IRNk(cN).
Therefore and because of (4), the projection gNk(c), being a subset of the nk-
dimensional hyperplane IRNk(cN), is characterized by the unique equalityW (uNk) =
c in the intrinsic coordinates of IRNk(cN), whence it follows that for every c,
dimgNk(c) = nk−1.
II. Sufficiency. From (6) for all real c and c′,
HNk(c
′)∩ IRNk(cN) = gNk(c)+((c′− c)Nk ,0N\Nk),
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i.e., for all c′ 6= c, every meet of set HNk(c′)∩ IRNk(cN) is obtained from gNk(c) by a
parallel shift along the diagonal DNk(c) of the hyperplane IR
Nk(cN),
DNk(c) = {u ∈ IRn | ui = u j, i, j ∈ Nk & ui = c, i /∈ Nk}.
If we show that for every k∈{1, . . . ,m} such that dimgNk(c) = nk− 1, all parallel
shifts of gNk(c) along DNk(c) in IR
Nk(cN) do not meet each other and cover the whole
IRNk(cN), it will follow that cylinders HNk(c) relevant to different c do not meet and
cover IRn. On the other hand, since W is defined on the entire IRn, for every u ∈
IRn, there exists a level surface of W containing u. Hence, because of (7) for every
real c, g(c) =HNk(c), which is the same as for all u ∈ IRn,W (u) =W (uNk). Thus, to
complete the proof of sufficiency, it is enough to show that for every k∈{1, . . . ,m}
for which dimgNk(c) = nk−1, the parallel shifts of gNk(c) along DNk(c) in IRNk(cN)
do not meet each other and cover IRNk(cN).
First, we show that for every k∈{1, . . . ,m}, the parallel shifts of gNk(c) along
DNk(c) in IR
Nk(cN) cover IRNk(cN). For any u ∈ IRn the level surface g(W (u))
passes through u. Whence and because of Remark 1, every g(W (u)) is a cone with
a top in {W (u)}N ∈ Dn and all level surfaces may be obtained from each other
by parallel shifts along Dn. Therefore, through every point in any two-dimensional
half-plane with a boundary Dn, denoted in the sequel by IR2±(Dn), passes a ray
that starts in some cN ∈ Dn and belongs completely to g(c). Moreover, since dif-
ferent level surfaces do not meet and are obtained from each other by parallel
shifts along Dn, from every point cN ∈ Dn, in any half-plane IR2±(Dn), there em-
anates a unique ray that belongs to g(c) and that does not meet other level sur-
faces g(c′), c′ 6= c. Parallel rays starting from different cN ∈ Dn and belonging
to some half-plane IR2±(Dn) cover the entire IR2±(Dn). Hence, for every cN ∈ Dn,
in any two-dimensional plane IR2(Dn) passing through Dn there are exactly two
rays starting from cN and located in distinct half-planes of IR2(Dn) separated by
Dn, i.e., in IR2+(Dn) and IR
2−(Dn) respectively; in particular, these two rays may
form a straight line meeting Dn in cN . A collection of mutually non-overlapping
pairs of rays relevant to different level surfaces g(c) covers IR2(Dn). Since every
u ∈ IRNk(cN)\DNk(c) and a straight line DNk(c) determine unambiguously a two-
dimensional plane, a set of all two-dimensional planes IR2(DNk(c))⊂ IRNk(cN) con-
taining the diagonal DNk(c) of IR
Nk(cN) covers IRNk(cN). Any plane IR2(DNk(c))
may be considered as a projection of a cylinder IR2(DNk(c))+ IR
N\Nk on IRNk(cN).
Since Dn ⊂ IR2(DNk(c))+ IRN\Nk , every cylinder IR2(DNk(c))+ IRN\Nk is covered
by a set of all two-dimensional planes IR2(Dn) ⊂ IR2(DNk(c)) + IRN\Nk . Observe
that Dn‖cN\Nk =DNk(c). Therefore, for each plane IR2(Dn)⊂ IR2(DNk(c))+ IRN\Nk
that is not orthogonal to IR2(DNk(c)), a projection of g(c)∩ IR2(Dn) on IRNk(cN)
consists of exactly two rays r˜1, r˜2 ⊂ gNk(c) starting from cN ∈DNk(c) and belonging
to the different half-planes IR2+(DNk(c)) and IR
2−(DNk(c)) of the plane IR
2(DNk(c))
that are separated by DNk(c), i.e., r˜1 ⊂ IR2+(DNk(c)), r˜2 ⊂ IR2−(DNk(c)). Any plane
orthogonal to IR2(DNk(c)) maps completely on DNk(c). Under parallel shifts along
DNk(c), rays r˜1 and r˜2 cover the entire plane IR
2(DNk(c)), while the collection of all
shifts of gNk(c) along DNk(c) covers the hyperplane IR
Nk(cN).
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To show that for every k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} for which dimgNk(c) = nk − 1, parallel
shifts of gNk(c) along DNk(c) in IR
Nk(cN) do not meet, it suffices to show that ev-
ery half-plane IR2±(DNk(c)) contains a ray belonging to gNk(c) and solely one. As-
sume the contrary, and let at least two rays r1,r2 ⊂ gNk(c)∩ IR2±(DNk(c)). Then
due to continuity of the level surface g(c) and continuity of the projection map-
ping Pr : IRn → IRNk(cN), the piece of a half-plane IR2±(DNk(c)) between rays r1
and r2 also belongs to gNk(c) as well, which is impossible since by hypothesis,
dimgNk(c) = nk−1. uunionsq
Remark 7 The necessary and sufficient condition in Lemma 2 may be restated
equivalently in terms of cylinders HNk(c). Indeed, the equality
dimgNk(c) = nk−1, for some k∈{1, . . . ,m},
is tantamount to the equality
g(c) = HNk(c), for the same k. (8)
Lemma 3. For every level surface g(c), if for some k∈{1, . . . ,m}
1) dimgNk(c) = nk− 1, then gN\Nk(c) = IRN\Nk(cN) and for all k′ ∈{1, . . . ,m},
k′ 6= k, gNk′ (c) = IRNk′ (cN);
2) dimgNk(c) = nk, then gN\Nk(c) 6= IRN\Nk(cN),
and furthermore, if gNk(c) = IR
Nk(cN), then dimgN\Nk(c) = n−nk−1,
while if gNk(c) 6= IRNk(cN), then dimgN\Nk(c) = n−nk.
Proof. To prove the first statement, assume that dimgNk(c) = nk− 1, for some k∈
{1, . . . ,m}. By (4) and (8), for all k∈{1, . . . ,m}
gN\Nk(c) = g(c)∩ IRN\Nk(cN) = HNk(c)∩ IRN\Nk(cN) = IRN\Nk(cN).
Similarly for all k′∈{1, . . . ,m}, k′ 6= k,
gNk′ (c) = g(c)∩ IRNk′ (cN) = HNk(c)∩ IRNk′ (cN) = IRNk′ (cN).
Prove now the second one. Assume the contrary that gN\Nk(c) = IR
N\Nk(cN).
Then because of (3), IRN\Nk(cN) ⊂ g(c), which is equivalent to W (u) =W (uNk).
Whence, by Lemma 2, dimgNk(c) = nk−1, which contradicts to the hypothesis.
Next, from Lemma 1 and Remark 3 it follows that either dimgN\Nk(c) = n−nk,
or dimgN\Nk(c) = n− nk− 1. If dimgN\Nk(c) = n− nk− 1, then by the Remark 7,
g(c) = HN\Nk(c). Obviously,
HN\Nk(c)∩ IRNk(cN) = IRNk(cN),
i.e.,
g(c)∩ IRNk(cN) = IRNk(cN),
whence by (4), gNk(c) = IR
Nk(cN).
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Further, if we suppose gNk(c) = IR
Nk(cN) and repeat the latter arguments, then
because of (3) and Lemma 2, we arrive at dimgN\Nk(c) = n−nk−1. uunionsq
Remark 8 Because of Remark 3, the validity of the second statement in the second
point of Lemma 3 can be obtained directly from the first point as well.
From the first statement of Lemma 3 applying the induction argument with re-
spect to the number m of subgroups Nk in the partition of N, we derive the next
corollary.
Corollary 1. For any level surface g(c) not every projection gNk(c), k∈{1, . . . ,m},
coincides with the corresponding hyperplane IRNk(cN).
Lemma 4. For every level surface g(c), for any k∈{1, . . . ,m}, a projection gNk(c)
either coincides with a hyperplane IRNk(cN) or dimgNk(c) = nk−1.
Proof. From the first statement of Lemma 3, if dimgNk(c) = nk and gNk(c) 6=
IRNk(cN), then dimgN\Nk(c) = n− nk. It follows that there exist a real e > 0 and
two points u1 ∈ gNk(c), u2 ∈ gN\Nk(c), such that ue1 = u1 + (eNk ,0N\Nk) ∈ gNk(c)
and ue2 = u2 + (0Nk ,eN\Nk) ∈ gN\Nk(c). Moreover, by Lemma 1 and Remark 3 ,
u1,ue1,u2,u
e
2 ∈ g(c). Consider the admissible transform f = {fi}i∈N :
fi(t) =
{
t+ e, i ∈ Nk,
t, i ∈ N\Nk.
By (2), W (fu1) =W (fue2). Then notice that fu1 = u
e
1 ∈ g(c). Hence, fue2 ∈ g(c).
But fue2 = u2 + eN , whence since u2 ∈ g(c) and since all level surfaces g(c′) for
different c′ can be obtained from each other by parallel shifts along Dn, fue2 ∈ g(c+
e). But for fue2 ∈ g(c), the latter is impossible. uunionsq
Remark 9 From Remark 4 it follows that, if for some c and k∈ {1, . . . ,m}, the
statement of Lemma 3 or of Lemma 4 holds true, then for the same k it holds true
for all c′ 6= c.
Proof of Theorem 1 From Corollary 1 and Lemma 4 it follows that for some k∈
{1, . . . ,m}, dimgNk(c) = nk−1. Moreover, by the first statement of Lemma 3, this k
is unique. Whence together with Lemma 2 we obtain the validity of Theorem 1. uunionsq
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